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By marking to market daily and making
sure participants maintain margin
requirements, credit risk is lower than it
would be if gains and losses were not
settled until the expiration date. For
some commodities, the credit risk is fur-
ther lowered by setting a cap on the
amount prices can change in any one
day, limiting a trader’s immediate losses.
This is not the case for oil, though; trad-
ing is halted for five minutes whenever a
contract is traded, bid, or offered for $10
above or below the initial price. 
Although crude oil futures began trading
on the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) in 1983, trading was rela-
tively limited until 1985. Today, oil is the
world’s most heavily exchanged com-
modity, with “light, sweet” crude the
most heavily traded of over 161 different
types. Oil that is “light” has a low den-
sity, and “sweet” means a low sulfur
content. These determine the quality of
the oil, or how much of the oil can be
refined into gasoline. West Texas Inter-
mediate (WTI) is a very high quality
crude oil, and therefore its price is usu-
ally higher than other blends, such as
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A useful first guess about the future
spot price of a commodity is usually
found in its current futures price. But
it doesn’t work that way when the
commodity in question is oil. This
Commentary explains why the char-
acteristics of oil, particularly the
value it can offer its owner by
remaining in the ground, cloud the
information that oil futures prices
give about future oil prices. 
Bad as the economic consequences of
higher oil prices might be, the fog sur-
rounding their future path only makes
things worse. People wonder, can they
go higher? Will they fall? To gain some
clarity, many observers have looked to
oil futures prices as a quick and easy
means to forecast the direction of oil
prices. After all, that is the market where
experts trade contracts for the future
delivery of oil. Unfortunately, futures
prices do not predict well. A close exam-
ination of the futures market may help
us understand the forces affecting oil
prices, but won’t tell us much about
where those prices are headed.
This Economic Commentary explains
the basic workings of the oil futures
market and the economic forces that set
the spot and futures prices of oil.
■ Crude Oil Futures
Until the late 1970s, oil prices were 
primarily determined by long-term con-
tracts between oil producers and interna-
tional oil companies. OPEC produced 
67 percent of the free world’s crude oil,
allowing it to dominate the price and
quantity of oil sold. Prices fluctuated
when these long-term contracts were
revised, but prices were not otherwise
particularly responsive to market condi-
tions. Spot markets—markets for imme-
diate delivery—were relatively unimpor-
tant, and accounted for only 10 percent 
of internationally traded crude oil. 
However, the oil market began to change
as non-OPEC countries surpassed
OPEC oil production for the first time in
1982. Owners of the newer oil, from
areas such as the North Sea, lacked the
typical long-term contracts with buyers,
forcing them to find other ways to build
market share. They were able to achieve
this objective on the spot markets by
undercutting OPEC. Buyers were
attracted by prices that could range as
much as $8 per barrel below long-term
contract prices. The strategy worked,
and a fundamental change took place in
the oil market. By the end of 1982,
almost half of all internationally traded
oil was traded on the spot market instead
of through long-term contracts. Even the
world’s largest oil companies began
turning from long-term contracts, replac-
ing them with market-determined price
agreements. With prices now determined
on a very-short-term basis, daily fluctua-
tions in the price of oil became the norm.
In order to hedge against daily fluctua-
tions in the oil market, participants
began purchasing oil futures. 
With an oil future, a buyer agrees to pur-
chase oil at a prespecified price and quan-
tity on a certain date in the future, the
expiration date. The agreement is made
today, but the oil and the payment are
delivered in the future. This contract elim-
inates the uncertainty and price risk for
both the buyer and seller. This insurance
comes at a cost, however. If the actual
spot price on the expiration date differs
from the futures price, one party will
regret signing the contract. This party has
an incentive to default on the agreement,
because he either purchased oil for higher
than the prevailing market price, or sold
oil for lower than the spot price. In order
to reduce the credit risk, futures contracts
are marked to market daily using the clos-
ing futures price. This means that when-
ever the closing futures price goes up or
down, the gain is credited to—or the loss
is debited from—the appropriate party’s
margin account. Participants must main-
tain a specified amount of funds (the 
margin requirement) in this account. Brent Blend, which is less sweet and not
as light. WTI is the crude benchmark in
the Americas because of its high quality
and because most WTI is refined in the
United States, where most gasoline is
consumed.
When most major U.S. newspapers
report the spot price of oil, they are
referring to the one-month NYMEX
futures price. A NYMEX crude oil
future is a contract for 1,000 barrels of
domestic light, sweet crude oil. To be
included in the contract, the oil must
meet specifications on sulfur content
and density. Because WTI meets these
standards, it is often traded in NYMEX
contracts. Therefore, the one-month
NYMEX crude oil futures price and
WTI spot price are nearly identical. An
exception to this is at the end of the
month, when the NYMEX futures con-
tract expires three days before the WTI
spot contract. The futures contracts are
traded for 30 consecutive months, plus
longer-term contracts of 36, 48, 60, 72,
and 84 months prior to delivery.
Figure 1 shows the spot and 12-month
futures prices since 1989. 
n Will Oil Prices Fall?
A glance at figure 1 reveals several
characteristics of oil prices. One is, with
apologies to the great stock speculator
Bernard Baruch, that they fluctuate. 
The second is the large (if not steady)
increase since 1999. The third pattern is
a bit more subtle, but equally important:
Spot prices are usually above futures
prices. In futures market jargon, this is
known as backwardation, and the oil
market is in backwardation more than
two-thirds of the time. What does this
tell us about the oil market?
One of the first guesses about why the
current spot price is above the futures
price is that prices are expected to fall.
In other words, the futures price is the
expected future spot price. After all, if
you think the spot price in six months
will be higher than the six-month
futures price, there’s a profit to be made:
You can buy the futures and in six
months turn around and sell the oil at
the higher spot price. People doing this
should bid up the futures price until
there is no more profit to be made. 
Conversely, if you see the futures price
higher than you think the spot will be,
sell the futures, which will drive down
the futures price. 
This reasoning is almost seductive in its
simplicity, but it is wrong. As we explain
below, it neglects some vital elements of
this particular market, such as interest
rates and the costs of storage, but the
most telling criticism is factual. On the
face of it, futures prices do not appear to
be the expected spot price. One bit of
evidence is the preponderance of back-
wardation: The oil market shows back-
wardation, with spot prices exceeding
futures prices, 70 percent of the time. If
futures predict spot prices, then spot
prices should fall quite often. But oil
prices do not fall anywhere near 70 per-
cent of the time. Indeed, as figure 1
shows, the futures market has been “pre-
dicting” a fall since 2002, as oil prices
more than doubled to record levels.
A closer look at the predictive ability of
the futures price bears this out. Perhaps
the simplest way of assessing a predic-
tor’s quality is to calculate the average
difference between the predicted and
actual value. In fact, the average error
using oil futures prices is larger than the
average error using the spot price. Errors
using futures prices get worse relative to
errors using spot prices the further out
one forecasts. On average, you’d do bet-
ter guessing that next year’s oil price will
be the same as today’s than using the 
12-month futures price (not that you’d 
do well).
Of course, average forecast error is not
necessarily the only way to assess a pre-
dictor’s quality. But more sophisticated
approaches, such as using mean squared
error or a linear regression to account for
bias, do not find much predictive ability
in oil futures.   
One still might suspect that if we
accounted for the average amount of
backwardation, we could get good predic-
tions. Removing the average backwarda-
tion helps little. The correlation between
the adjusted futures price and the actual
future spot is still about the same as the
correlation between the current spot and
actual future spot. This is true even for
varying time lengths although, not sur-
prisingly, the correlations go down the
further out in time one goes.
So it seems that futures prices are, in
general, no better a forecaster of future
oil prices than the spot price. The enthu-
siast of making oil price forecasts using
futures might wonder if futures prices
add information about future oil prices
that spot oil prices do not. Alternatively
stated, are forecasts that use both futures
prices and spot prices better than fore-
casts that use only the spot price? Even
in this case, the futures price adds little. 
n Theory of Storage and
Arbitrage
The failure of the “futures equals
expected future spot” theory of futures
prices is far from a recent phenomenon.
Many famous economists in the 1930s
and 1940s, such as John Maynard
Keynes, Sir John Hicks, and Holbrook
Working, noted its problems, at least for
“full-carry” markets, that is, markets
where extensive storage took place.
These economists were the first to real-
ize that a closer look at the costs and
benefits of storage might give a better
explanation of futures prices. 
In one sense, the flaw in the “expecta-
tions” approach to futures prices was that
it ignored uncertainty. You might think
prices were going to rise, but if you
weren’t certain, playing your hunch left
you open to a lot of risk. A high futures
price is then less like a sure thing and
more like a bet, and this affects the price
because there is risk associated with the
reward. Thinking about the problem from
the perspective of storage, however,
shows how analyzing profitable opportu-
nities can tie down the futures price.
Consider once again that six-month oil
futures contract. By taking it, you agree
to deliver oil in six months, and in six
months you get the agreed-upon price. If
you’re Shell Oil, or the Saudi royal fam-
ily, you have oil to deliver, but if you’re
not, you can acquire it—at a cost. What
does it cost to deliver the oil in six
months? One strategy is to borrow
money today to buy oil on the spot mar-
ket, store it for six months, and then
deliver it, get your payment, and pay
back your loan. This puts a bound on the
futures price: If the futures price is too
high, it’s worthwhile for market partici-
pants to buy oil and store it, driving the
spot price up and the futures price down.
Of course, the opposite strategy works if
the futures price is too low, selling oil
now and buying it on the futures market.
(Since this may involve short selling,
this case is a little trickier, but it
works—see the recommended readings
for carefully worked-out examples.)
This means that three things tie down
the futures price: the spot price, the
interest rate (borrowed money), and
storage costs. Or, to turn things around,the futures price tells us about today’s
spot price, interest rates, and storage
costs. Storage costs are generally pretty
obvious, since many agricultural com-
modities spoil; even goods that don’t,
such as oil or gold, cost something to
store. On average, then, this suggests
that futures prices should be higher than
spot prices because of interest charges
and storage costs. 
What then of backwardation, so com-
mon in the oil market, where the futures
price is lower than the spot price?  The
crucial insight is that for some goods
there are storage benefits as well as
storage costs. If these benefits are large
enough to balance storage costs and
interest rates, backwardation can result.
This storage benefit is referred to as the
“convenience yield.” 
Storage benefits may sound strange, but
the notion of a convenience yield is
quite intuitive. A convenience yield is
simply the benefit you get from owning
an object.  For instance, if you own a
car, you get to drive it; if you own a
house, you get to live in it; it has value
beyond its worth as a financial asset.
Another example would be art: You can
admire your Duchamp as it hangs in
your living room. A share of stock pro-
vides a less ethereal example; as it can
pay you a dividend of cold hard cash,
something you won’t get if you merely
have the right to buy it in the future.
How does this work out for oil? Well,
for one thing, oil’s explicit storage costs
are quite small because it is naturally
stored in the ground.  Explaining back-
wardation, though, requires more than
low storage costs, it requires conve-
nience yield, and not even J.R. Ewing
would think a barrel of oil in his sitting
room had quite the charm of a
Duchamp, Rodin, or Cassatt. 
How, then, can oil have a convenience
yield? First, it has a use option: If your
refinery really needs input today, you
can send it the oil you own. Having the
inventory on hand is often easier,
cheaper, and more convenient than
going out and buying what you need,
which may even be impossible on short
notice. So, for example, if you promised
gasoline to another company and face
substantial penalties for delay, having
oil you can deliver right now has its
advantages. In other words, you have
the option to stop speculating in oil and
to start consuming it. 
Owning oil has a related but more subtle
benefit. Because oil is easy to store in the
ground, there is a benefit to keeping it
there. Not only is the future demand for
oil—and thus its price—uncertain, but
future supply costs are uncertain as well.
Extraction costs (labor, drilling supplies,
pipe costs) are uncertain, and so the
profit from pumping oil six months from
now is unknown. Keeping the oil in the
ground today means that you can choose
whether or not to pump it in six months.
That is, if prices are high, pump out the
oil; if they are low, leave it in the ground
and wait for higher prices. Leaving the
oil in the ground gives you the option to
continue leaving it in the ground if
prices don’t shape up the way you want.
(Pump it today and you are faced with
high storage costs, risks of sabotage, or
damaging oil spills.) But if everyone
waits, there’s no oil around today—so
the price must rise to balance the two
effects. The net result is backwardation:
the price today is higher than the futures
price to give an incentive to pump some
oil now. The price today rises to offset
the advantage of waiting to see the price
before you pump.
■ Futures, Not Forecasts
The oil futures market is useful if you
want to hedge, or speculate, on the price
of oil, but it does not provide any easy
way to predict where the price of oil is
headed. When the good in question is
easily stored, as is oil, the same supply
and demand factors that would drive the
futures price up would also drive up
today’s spot price. Storage costs, interest
rates, and convenience yield then
account for the difference between spot
and futures prices. In particular, futures
prices below today’s spot price do not
mean that oil prices are expected to
decline. Nor is there anything special, or
unusual, about such backwardation.  
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